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“We are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence 
and aggression by those in power against the rights of their own 
people only when we make all men answerable to the law.” 1 
—Justice Jackson
The alien tort statUte (ats)
2 presents a UniQUe oppor-
tUnity to provide JUstice For victiMs oF egregioUs hUMan 
rights abUses aroUnd the World. The statute is radical: 
allow aliens to sue for violations of international law in the 
United States, violations that did not take place on our territory. 
Or is it radical? The First United States Congress passed the 
statute in 1789 and the Supreme Court validated its viability for 
egregious violations of human rights such as genocide, slavery, 
and torture in 2004.3 Although its use for modern violations of 
international law is relatively new, it provides a profound oppor-
tunity to hold all answerable to the law—even corporations. 
This article explores the possibility of holding corporations 
liable for violations of international law under the ATS for the 
acts of third parties. After a brief introduction and background of 
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the ATS, the article explains why third party liability for trans-
national corporations is a viable claim under the ATS. Finally, 
the article argues that courts should apply a third-party liability 
standard derived from federal common law.
introduCtion
Transnational corporations conduct business all over the 
world with ever-increasing frequency. The size, power and 
influence these corporations wield are unparalleled. In address-
ing the Senate in 1973 during investigations of the Nixon 
scandal, Senator Frank Church admitted that “when we speak 
of corporate and Government relationships, the language will 
be that which is appropriate to dealings between sovereigns.”4 
Although these corporations are subject to U.S. laws regarding 
their operations in the U.S., they are able to profit from govern-
ments that do not enforce a rule of law or protect their own 
people. This powerful relationship between corporations and 
foreign governments is often at issue under the ATS.
Federal courts have already seen a number of high profile 
ATS cases against transnational corporations. Companies such 
as Caterpillar, Exxon, Pfizer, Shell, and Unocal have been sued 
for their complicity in human rights violations committed in for-
eign countries. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether 
corporations can be held liable for the actions of third parties 
overseas. However, the concept of third party liability regard-
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jurisdictional issues. However, the Court recognized that the 
statute could not have been created to simply be ineffective and 
that the first Congress was too concerned with the consequences 
of violations of international law to leave the ATS “lying fallow 
indefinitely.” Alvarez-Machain lost his ATS claim, but human 
rights advocates rejoiced nevertheless: the Supreme Court had 
affirmed the viability of ATS claims.
third party LiabiLity is a vaLid Cause of aCtion 
under the ats
While the Supreme Court in Sosa resolved several issues 
regarding the ATS, the question of whether corporations can be 
held liable for the actions of third parties overseas, and under 
what standard, was not at issue. For those Circuit Courts that 
have found third party liability to be a viable claim under the 
ATS, they often arrived at disparate standards of liability. In 
the meantime, lower courts struggle to find a balance between 
effectuating the First Congress’s intent and preventing unwar-
ranted fishing expeditions against corporations. The result is 
an absolute disarray of decisions, which leave both plaintiffs 
and defendants in limbo as to their rights and legal responsibili-
ties. Multiple circuits and scholars have expressed the need for 
the Supreme Court to clarify the issue of third party corporate 
liability under the ATS. From this challenge two major issues 
emerge: (A) whether third party liability is a viable claim under 
the ATS and (B) if so, what standard of third party liability 
should apply?
third party LiabiLity survives the SoSa standard 
A two-step analytical inquiry emerged from Sosa to 
determine whether there is a viable claim under the ATS: (1) 
whether jurisdiction lies under the ATS and (2) whether to rec-
ognize a common-law cause of action to provide a remedy for 
the alleged violation of international law.10 The first inquiry 
under the Sosa test is whether federal subject-matter jurisdic-
tion is satisfied by the three explicit statutory conditions: (i) an 
alien sues (ii) for a tort (iii) committed in violation of the law 
of nations. If juris diction is determined, the second step by a 
court is to determine “whether a common-law cause of action 
should be created.”11 
The Sosa Court explicitly warned that there were only 
three types of offenses meant to fall under the term “law of 
nations” when the statute was enacted: the violation of safe 
conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 
Therefore, “any claim based on the present-day law of nations 
Third party liability is an umbrella term for the concept of hold-
ing a corporation complicit for its action, inaction or negligence, 
which results in injury or damage. For example, after World 
War II, corporate owners were convicted for supplying poison 
gas to the Nazis based on proof that they knew the purpose for 
which the gas was to be used.5 The difference today is not that 
the foreign sovereign has been defeated, but that it is unwilling 
or unable to prosecute. In such circumstances, does the ATS 
provide a remedy?
Despite the Supreme Court’s silence, the majority of the 
circuit courts believe that the ATS does provide a remedy when 
foreign sovereigns are unwilling or unable to prosecute. The 
State Department under the George W. Bush administration,6 
some scholars, and corporate lobbyists, however, speak out 
strongly against third party liability under the ATS. A common 
theme of the dissent is a fear of unreasonable and unlimited lia-
bility for corporations conducting business abroad under often 
unstable political regimes. This fear does not justify the strict 
elimination of third party liability under the ATS, but admittedly 
there is great need to clarify the standard under which corpora-
tions can be held liable. As it stands, lower courts have proposed 
numerous standards under similar-sounding labels that give rise 
to confusion as to the rights and responsibilities of claimants 
and defendants alike. The Supreme Court should confirm the 
viability of third party liability under the ATS and look to well-
defined federal common law standards, which already govern 
corporate actions under U.S. law. Doing so would effectuate the 
Congress’s intent upon creating the statute, fulfill due process 
notions of fairness and notice, and continue the United States 
down the path of leading the world toward more socially respon-
sible investment abroad. 
baCkground
The ATS, states “the district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”7 Although the statute lay practically unused for nearly 
two hundred years, in the 1980s the Second Circuit in Filártiga 
v. Peña-Irala8 interpreted the ATS to be a living statute that 
could provide a remedy for modern day human rights violations. 
The United States Supreme Court did not weigh in on the issue 
until 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.9 The Sosa Court held 
that the ATS is only a jurisdictional statute. The determination 
was based in part on the fact that it was originally included in 
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which dealt solely with 
Although its use for modern violations of international 
law is relatively new, [the ATS] provides a  
profound opportunity to hold all answerable to the law—
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to rest on a norm of international character [must be] accepted 
by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable 
to the features of the 18th-century paradigms . . . recognized.”12 
Thus, only violations of “specific, universal and obligatory” 
norms of international law are actionable under the ATS.13 To 
date, case law has generally determined that the following torts 
meet the rigorous standard of “specific, universal and obliga-
tory” and are thereby actionable under the ATS: torture, sum-
mary execution, disappearance, prolonged arbitrary detention, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial 
killing, and slavery. Human rights violations that may trigger 
ATS jurisdiction are cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
child labor, racial discrimination, environmental harm, kidnap-
ping, right to freedom of association, and financing terrorist 
organizations. 
The most common defense by corporate defendants is that 
third party liability is not a “specific, universal and obligatory” 
norm under the law of nations. This defense conflates the plain 
language of the ATS. The underlying tort is the violation of 
the law of nations and therefore must meet the Sosa “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” standard for determining what torts 
warrant prosecution under the ATS. The subsidiary rule of third 
party liability is an ancillary issue and not the underlying tort 
and therefore should not be required to meet the Sosa standard. 
Instead, it is a federal court’s function to determine which sub-
sidiary rules of decision are most appropriate to effectuate the 
intent of the statute. 
Even if a court were to require third party liability to meet 
the Sosa standard, however, history demonstrates that third 
party liability is a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm 
under the law of nations. In 1789, when the ATS was enacted, 
the federal courts recognized third party liability for violations 
of international law. Attorney General William Bradford, in a 
1795 opinion, discussed aiding and abetting criminal and civil 
liability under the ATS, of U.S. citizens who joined a French 
attack on a British colony in Sierra Leone.14 Additionally, 
several eighteenth-century cases applying international law 
found liability for aiding and abetting, such as the 1795 Court 
in Talbot v. Janson.15 Similarly, Henfield’s Case16 stated that 
U.S. citizens may be held liable under the laws of the United 
States for “committing, aiding or abetting hostilities” in viola-
tion of the law of nations.17 Furthermore, numerous World War 
II cases found accomplice liability for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.18 
More recently, decisions of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) established third party 
liability standards.19 Modern treaties such as the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
prohibit not only genocide but also complicity and conspiracy 
to commit genocide.20 Additionally, Article 25 of the Rome 
Statute, which established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in 1998, states that a person may be liable if “[f]or the 
 purpose of facilitating the commission of [a] crime, aids, abets 
or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commis-
sion, including providing the means for its commission.”21 Thus, 
third party liability was recognized as a viable form of liability 
for “specific, universal and obligatory” norms of international 
law not only at the time the ATS was enacted, but it is recog-
nized as customary international law today as well.  
Another common defense to corporate third party liability 
under the ATS is the claim that international law regulates nations 
and does not address individuals or private relationships. Early 
international law, however, established that certain violations 
permit individual liability (i.e. the prohibition against piracy). 
Modern day courts have extended that reasoning to human rights 
violations such as prohibitions against the slave trade and certain 
war crimes. The Second Circuit in Kadić v. Karadžić,22 recog-
nized the liability of individuals under the ATS and stated, “we 
do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern 
era, confines its reach to state actions.” Defendant corporations 
further contend that while there may be liability for individuals, 
international law does not impose obligations or liability on 
juridical actors or artificial persons such as corporations. The 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, however, states that, “individuals and corporations have 
some independent status as persons in international law. . . .” 
Where a particular international norm applies to private actors, 
corporate liability can and should be found. 
Defendants also commonly argue that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank of Denver 23 
bars corporate third party liability under the ATS. In Central 
Bank, the Supreme Court decided that because section 10(b) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934 does not explicitly include 
aiding and abetting liability, the Court would not imply it. 
The Court reasoned that the exclusion of aiding and abetting 
from section 10(b) was deliberate because Congress explicitly 
included such liability in other New Deal legislation drafted 
during the same time period. 
The argument that Central Bank precludes third party liabil-
ity under the ATS takes the Supreme Court’s reasoning for its 
decision out of context. The Court’s reasoning clearly does not 
stand for the proposition that third party liability is never to be 
applied unless explicitly stated by a statute. In fact, the Supreme 
Court in Meyers v. Holley 24 assumed that Congress intended 
the Fair Housing Act to incorporate third party liability for tort 
actions. Consequently, it can be concluded that Central Bank 
merely highlights the necessity of analyzing the ATS in the con-
text of the time in which it was created to determine whether to 
imply third party liability under the statute. Similarly, one can 
conclude that the drafters of the ATS would have assumed third 
party liability was to be a form of liability under any violation 
of international law. Many courts assessing third party liability 
under the ATS dismiss this argument because Central Bank 
should not be erroneously applied where international law is 
applicable.25 However, even if federal common law were appli-
cable, as is argued below, Central Bank would not bar corporate 
aiding and abetting under the ATS for the contextual reasons 
stated above.
Finally, a common policy argument by defendants is that 
more harm than good will be done under the ATS because 
corporations will stop investing in developing countries. Such 
a chilling effect would allegedly stifle trade and some go so far 
as to say it would entirely offset any liberalization gained by the 
current trade-negotiation round of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the Doha Development Round. According to such dis-
sent, “the ultimate losers will be millions of impoverished peo-
ple denied an opportunity to participate in global markets.”26 
This line of reasoning is simply unfounded. Similar argu-
ments were made during the development of domestic product 
16
liability tort law, but history clearly demonstrates that require-
ments that corporations act in a socially responsible manner 
will not discourage investment. The same will be true under 
the ATS. The Supreme Court limited the scope of the ATS to 
violations of human rights that rise to the level of being accepted 
as customary international law. Such violations include geno-
cide, slavery, disappearance, torture, war crimes, and summary 
execution—crimes for which any society would gladly forfeit a 
few foreign direct investment dollars to eradicate. Furthermore, 
the positive correlation between political stability and foreign 
investment is widely known.
In conclusion, third party liability is a subsidiary rule of deci-
sion that effectuates the first Congress’ intent upon creating the 
statute. Even if the courts were to require third party liability to 
meet the Sosa “specific, universal and obligatory” standard, his-
tory demonstrates its viability as an actionable claim under the 
ATS. This determination is not barred by Central Bank and when 
taken as a whole, including the important policy goals of deter-
ring corporate involvement in egregious human rights abuses, it 
is clear that the ATS encompasses third-party liability.
Courts shouLd appLy existing federaL  
CoMMon Law standards 
Once it has been determined that third party liability is a 
viable claim under the ATS, the immediate problem arises as 
to which standard of third party liability should apply. Therein 
lies the most confusing and controversial aspect of corporate 
third party liability under the ATS. Despite great dispute over 
the existence of federal common law, the Supreme Court in 
Sosa made it clear that federal common law provided a cause 
of action for violations of international law under the ATS.27 
Determining that federal common law governs the ATS, how-
ever, merely gives courts discretion to borrow or incorporate 
state law, international law and/or foreign law (law of the coun-
try where the tort occurred). Alternatively, courts could, and 
should, simply apply existing and well-settled theories of third 
party liability under federal common law for two reasons. 
First, looking to federal common law to define principles 
of third party liability is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of other federal statutes. For example, in Beck 
v. Prupis,28 the Court analyzed the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)29 and made a clear distinc-
tion between the “underlying tortious act” and “the means for 
establishing third party liability for the underlying tort.” The 
Court ultimately looked to federal common law to establish the 
elements of third party liability. Similarly, the Supreme Court 
relied on federal common law of agency in the context of the 
Copyright Act,30 rather than on the law of any particular state.31 
Under the ATS, courts should pursue a similar analysis and look 
to federal common law to determine the definition of third party 
liability.
Second, considerations of uniformity and predictability sup-
port the use of federal common law over that of state law, for-
eign law and international law. Corporations of the size typically 
implicated in ATS claims often have sufficient jurisdictional 
contacts to be hailed into court in several, if not all, fifty states. 
All parties would benefit from the use of clearly defined federal 
common law standards and reliance on such standards would 
eliminate the risk of forum shopping. Furthermore, applying 
federal common law does not implicate serious constitutional 
concerns about displacing state law, since the ATS deals with 
violations of international law, an “area in which the Tenth 
Amendment has reserved little or no power to the states.”32 
Similarly, foreign law should not apply because of related con-
cerns about uniformity and predictability. ATS cases often arise 
in failed or repressive states where there is no redress within 
the domestic legal system. Applying foreign law would often 
invalidate the claim and not provide a remedy. Furthermore, 
it would be extremely burdensome to force judges to analyze 
legal systems that could not be adequately understood without 
extensive cultural research of varying legal orders that often 
transform overnight. 
Correspondingly, international law does not provide the 
notice and uniformity appropriate for third party liability under 
the ATS. International law clearly encompasses third party 
liability, but a single definition of the standard is nearly impos-
sible. Customary international law, by its very definition and 
creation, does not require strict consensus as to its elements; 
rather, the core principle of the norm forms its foundation. 
Given the diversity of cultures and legal systems involved in 
establishing customary international law it is not surprising that 
variance exists as to exact peripheral elements.33 
The uncertainty this variance can cause in determining liabil-
ity is demonstrated by the different third party liability standards 
defined in Khulumani and Unocal—both under the label of 
international law. In Khulumani, Judge Robert Katzmann deter-
mined that international law, as governed by the Rome Statute, 
establishes third party liability when the defendant “provide[s] 
practical assistance to the principal which has a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime and does so with the purpose of 
facilitation the commission of that crime.”34 The Ninth Circuit 
in Unocal, on the other hand, determined that international law, 
as governed by decisions of the ICTY and ICTR, establishes 
third party liability when the defendant had actual or construc-
tive “knowledge that [his/her] actions will assist the perpetrator 
in the commission of the crime.”35 
The Rome Statute’s requirement of providing practical 
assistance with “the purpose of” facilitating the commission 
of that crime is a much higher standard than any of the other 
third party liability standards set forth by international law 
tribunals since World War II. It is questionable whether the 
Rome Statute even amounts to customary international law. 
J. Katzmann uses the Rome Statute as evidence of customary 
international law because it “has been signed by 139 countries 
and ratified by 105, including most of the mature democracies 
of the world.” Customary international law is not determined by 
how many countries sign a treaty or statute but by opinio juris, 
a demonstrated legal obligation. There has not been enough 
time since the statute was passed for the ICC (created by the 
Rome Statute) to decide a case using the standard, much less for 
nations to demonstrate that they feel themselves legally bound 
by it. Khulumani and Unocal exemplify the difficulty of defin-
ing international law and the sweeping differences among the 
definitions of third party liability that can fit under the label of 
international law. 
In light of the current disarray of third party liability stan-
dards emanating from federal courts under ATS decisions, the 
need for uniformity is great. Corporate defenders dubbed the 
ATS “the awakening monster” due in part to the uncertainty of 
potential liability under the ATS. Using federal common law to 
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determine the principles of third party liability would provide 
the necessary due process notions of notice, uniformity and pre-
dictability guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Existing federal 
common law principles such as joint liability, agency, and reck-
less disregard already govern corporations in the United States. 
Therefore, the use of federal common law standards would 
clarify corporate understanding of their liabilities abroad, rather 
than disrupt any reliance they may have on the current plethora 
of standards avowed by the courts. Rather, it will clarify the 
exact standards by which corporations will be expected to shape 
their actions regarding egregious human rights abuses abroad.
the effeCt of appLying federaL CoMMon Law as 
opposed to internationaL Law
When courts face the choice between federal common law 
and international law standards of third party liability, the deci-
sion has several important consequences. Generally, the federal 
common law standard of third party liability is a more difficult 
standard to prove than that set forth by international law tribu-
nals since World War II. For example, the ICTR and ICTY stan-
dards of third party liability include assistance or encouragement 
that has a “substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.” In 
contrast, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, one is 
subject to liability if “substantial assistance or encouragement” 
is given. Therefore, under international law a person could give 
very limited assistance that happens to have a substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime and be held liable. The same is 
not necessarily true under federal common law.
One specific difference between third party liability under 
federal common law and international law is the issue of intent. 
Under the ICTR and ICTY standard of third party liability, 
the necessary intent to find liability is satisfied with “actual 
or constructive knowledge.” By contrast, under federal com-
mon law the aider and abettor must “know” that their conduct 
gives substantial assistance.36 The use of the word “knows” in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 is defined in § 12 of the 
same Restatement and explicitly precludes the constructive 
knowledge application allowable under the international law. 
The difference between having to prove actual knowledge versus 
the ability under international law to hold a corporation liable if 
it should have inferred that its conduct would give substantial 
assistance is significant to both a corporation’s understanding of 
its responsibilities as a possible aider and abettor and the issues 
of burden of proof for a plaintiff.
Another specific difference between federal common law and 
international law relates to the issue of “moral support.” Moral 
support includes any action that aids the perpetrator in ways that 
are not strictly physical (i.e. providing arms) or financial. To 
date, the scope of “moral support” under both international law 
and federal common law is unclear. Under international law, as 
established by decisions of the ICTY and the ICTR, aiding and 
abetting requires “practical assistance, encouragement, or moral 
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.”37 However, neither the ICTY nor the ICTR have specifi-
cally defined “moral support” through a decision. With regard 
to federal common law, the Ninth Circuit in Unocal noted that 
“there may be no difference between encouragement [of the 
Restatement (Second)] and ‘moral support’” of the international 
standard of third party liability.38 Indeed, Comment (d) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (1986) states, “[a]dvice or 
encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfea-
sor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the 
same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or 
physical assistance.” Therefore, it is unclear exactly how claims 
alleging third party liability for “moral support” would play out 
differently under international law and federal common law 
standards. 
Advocates view the 
ATS as an opportunity 
for the United States to 
continue to lead the world 
in bringing justice to those 
who suffer egregious 
human rights abuses.
ConCLusion
The above discussion demonstrates the complex and con-
fusing nature of third party liability standards used by federal 
courts under similar labels but with wholly differing meanings. 
What is overwhelmingly clear, however, is the need to affirm 
the viability of third party liability under the ATS. Once that 
is established, courts should draw from existing federal com-
mon law third party liability standards to clarify the rights and 
responsibilities of both plaintiffs and defendants. Advocates 
view the ATS as an opportunity for the United States to con-
tinue to lead the world in bringing justice to those who suffer 
egregious human rights abuses. Human rights abuses must stop 
and financial pressure by investing corporations could provide 
a more effective remedy than any existing convention or treaty. 
The existing body of domestic law on third-party liability, if 
adopted as a method of implementing the ATS, would temper 
corporations’ fears of an infinite liability that could come with 
investing in a foreign country. Until federal courts establish the 
uniformity and predictability that could arise from relying on 
existing federal common law standards of third party liability, 
the statute will continue to loom as the “awakening monster” 
rather than its true potential as a “small, but important step in 
the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal 
violence.”39 HRB
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